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Abstract—The traceable execution of business processes and
choreographies using smart contracts is one prominent applica-
tion of blockchain technology in Business Process Management
(BPM). Existing approaches support a large set of patterns,
modeling languages, and blockchain architectures, which cover a
wide range of practical scenarios. However, they largely neglect
the important aspect of time, a crucial part of process and
choreography models manifested in deadlines, delays, and other
temporal constraints. We argue that this deficit is due to inherent
limitations of smart contracts—in particular the absence of
a natural notion of measuring time—on popular blockchain
platforms used in research and practice. We introduce a set
of time measures available on blockchain platforms to alleviate
these issues, and systematically compare their properties. We also
give hints as to their suitability for facilitating various temporal
constraints commonly found in process models.
Index Terms—executable processes, blockchain, smart con-
tracts, temporal constraints
I. INTRODUCTION
In Business Process Management (BPM), process and cho-
reography models are used to specify processes within and
between organizations, respectively [1]. While models often
serve documentation purposes only, they are also used as
source artifacts in model-driven process execution on different
target platforms. One such target platform are blockchain-
based smart contracts, which have been shown to enable trans-
parent, tamper-proof, and auditable process execution which
is especially valuable for inter-organizational communication
between untrusted partners [2].
Sophisticated approaches have emerged, allowing users to
employ a large bandwidth of process modeling tools [3]–
[6]. They have a drawback in common, however; they do
not properly take into account time, which is of paramount
importance in process models in general [7] and in contractual
agreements in particular [8]. Deadlines have to be kept and
timeouts have to be observed closely for partners to achieve
a common business goal, and process modeling languages
naturally provide a multitude of elements to express such
temporal constraints [9].
This deficiency is ostensibly due to the peculiar properties
and mining protocols of commonly used blockchain platforms.
Smart contracts are entirely transaction-driven and executed
within a closed-world environment without access to global
timing information. As such, a smart contract executing certain
parts of the model can often not reliably decide whether a
temporal constraint is violated or not.
In this paper, we want to alleviate these issues in a four-step
approach. First, (i) an abstract formal model of blockchain is
introduced, based on which (ii) a set of time measures which
can be used within the narrow confines of a smart contract is
developed. We then (iii) critically compare properties of the
measures, such as accuracy and trust, before (iv) discussing
how they can be used to implement generic temporal con-
straints found in process models. By doing so, we hope to give
structured insights into the techniques which can be used by
blockchain-based process execution approaches, and provide
guidelines on how to chose the right measure for a given
approach.
As a motivating example throughout the paper, we will
consider a simplified invoicing choreography between a Mo-
bile Network Operator (MNO) and one of their customers.
Figure 1 shows a view of the orchestration process of the MNO
modeled using the de-facto industry standard Business Process
Model and Notation (BPMN) [10]. It starts on the 1st of each
month with the sending of an invoice. The customer may pay
directly, or be reminded every seven days incurring additional
overdue fines. Also, they may file a complaint with the MNO,
e.g., because of an incorrect charge on the invoice. The invoice
is then manually adjusted, and a message asking for patience
is sent regularly every 24 hours to keep the customer informed.
The example illustrates that temporal constraints are pervasive
in business processes, and blockchain-based process execution
approaches necessarily need to support such scenarios in order
to gain widespread acceptance.
The paper is structured as follows. Preliminary knowledge
and a detailed problem statement are conveyed in Sect. II.
A formalization of the abstract structure of blockchains is
provided in Sect. III, which is used to define and assess a set of
time measures available in blockchain-based process execution
in Sect. IV. We gauge whether the time measures are suitable
for implementing temporal constraints in Sect. V, before
critically discussing and evaluating the results in Sect. VI. We
review related work based on our findings in Sect. VII, and
finally conclude in Sect. VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
This section establishes preliminary knowledge pertaining to
temporal constraints in business processes and the underlying
techniques and restrictions of blockchain technology as well
as smart contracts. The state of the art of blockchain-based
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Fig. 1. Running example of a simple choreography between an MNO and its customer for sending and handling an invoice
process execution is then assessed on that basis to further
narrow down the problem statement at hand.
A. Temporal Constraints in Business Process Management
Temporal constraints are ubiquitous in business processes
and choreographies and have been an active field of research
for decades [7]. They can be broadly divided into three
categories: intra-activity, e.g., durations of atomic tasks; inter-
activity, e.g., delays between activities and events; and inter-
process temporal constraints, i.e., deadlines between partners
in a choreography [9].
The running example in Fig. 1, for instance, contains the
latter two categories of constraints, modeled using timer events
discernible by the clock symbol. They have different purposes,
like initially starting a process instance at the “1st of [the]
month” which then indirectly triggers the customer’s local
orchestration process (inter-process), or expressing delays such
as “7 days” in the process flow (inter-activity).
In any case, timer events are further refined from their
natural language label by a formal specification. BPMN largely
follows a generic distinction between absolute and relative
temporal constraints [9], and allows for three different no-
tions of timer events following the ISO-8601 standard (see
Tab. I) [10, p. 273]. Dates are used to wait for a specific,
absolute point in time; durations are used to delay process
execution or represent timeouts relative to the event’s enable-
ment; and cycles are used to model actions that are taken in
a recurring fashion. The latter may start at an absolute point
in time or relative to the event’s enablement.
Another more indirect temporal constraint is also found in
the example, a common pattern known as deferred choice [11].
It is used in situations in which the process waits for one
of several events to happen, and picks the one “first trig-
gered” [10, p. 437] for the final execution. In BPMN, the
pattern is modeled using event-based gateways, diamond-
shaped elements containing two circles and a pentagon, which
create a kind of temporal race between the following events.
B. Blockchain Technology and Smart Contracts
Graduating from its original motivation in the finance do-
main [12], blockchain technology has since emerged as a core
platform for secure trustless applications [13]. The blockchain
does not only store a list of account balances anymore, but
also application logic in the form of executable code and its
associated state, which is generally called a smart contract.
Smart contracts are not continuously running but trig-
gered externally using transactions propagated in the net-
work. Transactions and their effects are only applied to the
blockchain’s overall state during mining, a procedure in which
information is appended to the blockchain as a new block. In
order to generate a block, a network participant—the miner—
bundles a set of pending transactions, assigns them an order,
and sequentially applies them, altering account balances and
executing smart contract code. Once finished, the block is
forwarded to the other nodes in the network to append it to
their local versions of the blockchain.
All of these steps are secured via cryptographic schemes,
consensus protocols, and incentivization measures depending
on the blockchain implementation, with numerous complex
extensions being constantly explored and proposed. Ulti-
mately, this interplay of techniques results in the strong
security guarantees of blockchain technology such as integrity,
TABLE I
TIMER EVENT DEFINITIONS IN BPMN IN ACCORDANCE TO ISO-8601
Name Example
Date 2020-12-24T12:00:00Z
(noon on Dec. 24th, 2020, UTC)
Duration P7D
(7 days)
Cycle (abs.) R/2020-01-01/P1M
(every 1st of the month from 2020)
Cycle (rel.) R7/PT24H
(every 24 hours for 7 days)
transparency, and immutability, despite potentially distrustful
participants in the network [13].
C. Blockchain Oracles
A direct consequence of the blockchain’s favorable proper-
ties is a strict closed-world assumption, i.e., data external to
the blockchain which could be altered or go missing can not
be accessed from within smart contracts for integrity reasons.
Rather, the blockchain needs to be entirely self-contained for
later validation. Common patterns to somewhat mitigate this
restriction use oracles [14]. Oracles are operated by third-party
providers and supply external data to the blockchain. They
generally work using one of two schemes [15]:
The data may be stored directly on the blockchain for
immediate read access, which we will call storage oracle.
For this purpose, an oracle provider maintains a publicly
known smart contract (see Fig. 2a) and regularly updates it
via dedicated transactions (steps 1.1, 1.2). The data can then
be synchronously read by consumer smart contracts (steps 2.1–
2.3). One example for such a service in practice is OrFeed1,
which provides cryptocurrency exchange rates on Ethereum
using a similar mechanism.
Alternatively, data may be asynchronously requested from
within the blockchain using request-response oracles (see
Fig. 2b). Here, the oracle provider operates a publicly known
smart contract acting as a proxy. Data requests directed at
this smart contract (steps 1.1, 1.2) are emitted using the
blockchain’s event layer, which the provider actively listens to
(step 1.3). The query is performed off-chain, and the provider
sends a transaction with the result of the query back to the
original requester (steps 2.1, 2.2). Request-response oracles
might provide general-purpose services, like Provable2, or
more domain-specific ones such as Ethereum Alarm Clock3.
D. Blockchain-Based Execution of Business Process
The potential of blockchain technology in the area of BPM
has been widely acknowledged [16]. One field of particular
interest involves the blockchain-based execution of business
processes, especially in the context of contractual interactions
between distrustful partners benefiting from the platform’s
strong security guarantees [2].
Approaches like Caterpillar [4] or Lorikeet [3] collectively
provide support for a large set of modeling languages and
elements and can be roughly categorized as follows: They
either translate executable process models into semantically
equivalent smart contracts [3]–[6], [17] or provide interpreter
smart contracts which then work on process specifications
directly [18], [19], e.g., simulating a token system. The re-
sulting smart contracts are either used as a connector between
different participant’s local Business Process Management
Systems (BPMS), or even provide some features of a BPMS
themselves like on-chain worklist handlers or monitoring tools.
1https://www.orfeed.org/docs/, 2020-04-15
2http://provable.xyz/, 2020-03-19
3https://www.ethereum-alarm-clock.com/, 2020-03-19
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Fig. 2. Schematic usage of oracles
Regardless the architecture, participants interact with pro-
cess instances via transactions, during which conditions and
constraints specified in the model are checked in the trusted
on-chain environment. Referring to the running example (see
Fig. 1), for instance, the MNO might be submitting a transac-
tion to the invoicing smart contract to “add overdue fines” after
they sent a transaction for “send invoice”. The smart contract
now needs to check whether “7 days” have actually passed
between the transactions to ensure compliance.
However, determining whether this or other temporal con-
straints are fulfilled is not trivial, which forms the basis of our
problem statement: Since process instances are smart contracts
executed within the confines of the blockchain, the general
restrictions mentioned in Sect. II-B apply:
1) Smart contracts are executed in a closed-world en-
vironment and can not readily access global timing
information and clocks.
2) Smart contracts are inherently passive structures only
activated within synchronous calls during the mining
of transactions and do not offer continuous runtime
behavior or timer monitoring.
3) Since transactions originate from single participants and
are propagated through a network of mutually distrustful
nodes, there is no reliable timestamp attached to them
individually, as it could not be independently verified.
These limitations make it hard to pinpoint the exact time a
transaction was originally issued, and thus correctly enforce
temporal constraints specified in the underlying model. While
the blockchain domain is very diverse and not all technologies
might exhibit the same extent of restrictions (see Sect. VI),
existing approaches largely neglect or glance over these issues
and the challenges implied (see Sect. VII). In this paper, we
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Fig. 3. Timeline and properties of blocks in a blockchain
contribute a novel and holistic analysis of enforcing temporal
constraints found in business processes within blockchain
environments, providing possible solutions and evaluating their
utility and drawbacks.
III. BLOCKCHAIN FORMALIZATION
To ground the remaining paper in a formal framework, we
abstract the structure of a blockchain to its core components.
This abstraction is based on literature [13] and on implemen-
tations like Ethereum [20] and Tezos [21], and covers a large
variety of blockchains found in practice (see Sect. VI-B1).
Note that we will not consider low-level effects like network
latency in our formalization. We assume that there is an
optimal, instantaneous connection between all peers of the
blockchain network, and only take into account delays and
effects directly related to the blockchain’s protocols.
Definition 1 (blockchain). A blockchain B = (B0, ..., Bn) is
a cryptographically linked list of n numbered blocks. Blocks
Bi = (si, Ti) contain a strictly increasing block timestamp
si ∈ N with si−1 < si ∀ 0 < i ≤ n and a transaction list Ti.
In literature, the term block height is often used interchange-
ably with block number. The first block B0 of a blockchain
is called genesis block. We regard a timestamp to be a scalar
value, for example representing an Unix timestamp. We do
not model the contents of transactions in this paper. For us,
only the exact time a transaction was created by its original
sender locally before being propagated within the blockchain
network is relevant:
Definition 2 (transaction timestamp). For any transaction tx,
let stx ∈ N be the timestamp the transaction was initially
created and signed by its sender.
Figure 3 illustrates an excerpt of a blockchain mapped
against a timeline. The block timestamp si of each visible
block Bi is fixed at the start of mining, i.e., when a miner
bundles the set of transactions and begins performing the
mining procedure, which takes some computing time.
Definition 3 (mining time). Let B = (B0, ..., Bn) be a
blockchain. The duration of the mining procedure of a block
Bi is called the mining time mi
Some blockchain networks like Ethereum [20] and Bit-
coin [12] aim at achieving a fixed block generation rate, and
adjust the difficulty of their mining algorithms constantly to
react to changes in the network’s overall power. The important
measure in this context is block time, the interval between
two consecutive blocks (not to be confused with the block
timestamp):
Definition 4 (block time). Let B = (B0, ..., Bn) be a block-
chain. The block time bi of a block Bi, 0 < i ≤ n, is defined
as bi := si − si−1.
Lastly, after transactions are created and signed by their
sender, they need to be propagated, picked up by a miner, and
included in a block. This takes a certain amount of time:
Definition 5 (inclusion time). Let B = (B0, ..., Bn) be a
blockchain and tx ∈ Ti an arbitrary transaction in some
block Bi = (si, Ti), 0 < i ≤ n. Then the delay between the
transaction’s initial creation stx and the time it was included
in the block is called the inclusion time dtx := si− stx of tx.
IV. TIME MEASURES IN BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS
To correctly execute business processes in smart contracts
on the blockchain, the exact time a transaction was originally
created—the transaction timestamp—needs to be determined,
as it eventually decides whether temporal constraints defined
in the model were complied with despite potential delays in
the blockchain processing. Since this information is not readily
available (see Sect. II-B), we propose a number of alternative
methods to measure time within smart contracts with different
advantages and drawbacks. Table II shows an overview of the
measures, and presents a rough relative comparison regarding
various metrics on a scale from best to worst.
For simplicity reasons, we will use tx to denote an arbitrary
transaction contained in a block Bi = (si, Ti), i.e., tx ∈ Ti, of
an arbitrary blockchain B = (B0, ..., Bn). The ultimate goal
is to acquire a suitable estimate for stx.
A. Definition of Measures
We differentiate between five measures of time available in
the scope of a transaction to a smart contract. Two of these
are tied to the block the transaction is contained in (block
timestamp MBT, block number MBN), one requires manual
input (parameter MPA), and two are based on oracles (storage
oracle MSO, request-response oracle MRO).
1) Block Timestamp: Transaction tx has access to the
timestamp si of its including block Bi, which can be used as a
measure MBT(tx) := si. The miner of Bi fixes the timestamp
when they start assembling the block, since it is part of the
cryptographically relevant block metadata, and thus crucial in
ascertaining the blockchain’s integrity.
2) Block Number: The block number of a block Bi can
be used to estimate the block timestamp si, and in extension
the timestamps of the transactions contained in it. That is,
if the mean block time is b¯, then Bi would have had to be
mined i times b¯ after the genesis block, or more formally at
MBN(tx) := s0 + i · b¯.
This measure can not only be used to determine the absolute
“age” of a block from the genesis block, but also the time
interval between two blocks. For any two arbitrary blocks Bi
and Bj , they were roughly mined |i− j| · b¯ milliseconds apart.
TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF TIME MEASURES AND RELATIVE COMPARISON ON A SCALE FROM BEST (• • •) TO WORST (◦ ◦ ◦)
Measure Block timestamp Block number Parameter Storage oracle Request-response
MBT MBN MPA MSO oracle MRO
Timestamp
included in the
block by its miner
Number of a block
in relation to mean
block time
Parameter added to
a smart contract
transaction
External provider
regularly injecting
timestamps
External provider
being queried with
separate callback
Accuracy • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
Trust • • ◦ • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
Immediacy • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦
Cost • • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Reliability • • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
This is useful for estimating relative time differences, as we
will discuss in Sect. V.
3) Parameter: Smart contract functions may receive ar-
bitrary arguments encoded in the payload of the calling
transaction tx. A function can thus be designed to take in
an additional argument, namely a timestamp set by the sender
of the transaction, which we will denote with MPA(tx). For
example, the smart contract function in Listing 1 can only be
called if the supplied timestamp is below 1608811200 (noon
on Dec. 24th, 2020, UTC).
Listing 1
SOLIDITY SMART CONTRACT FUNCTION WITH TIMESTAMP PARAMETER
function withDeadline(uint timestamp) external {
require(timestamp < 1608811200,
"deadline missed");
// ...
}
4) Storage Oracle: A storage oracle as displayed in Fig. 2a
could be designed to regularly inject a current trusted real-
world timestamp into a designated smart contract. Any tx
could then be approximately dated by retrieving this measure
MSO(tx) via an inter-contract function call.
5) Request-response Oracle: Time servers are a backbone
of distributed computing, and provide clock synchronization
through protocols such as the Network Time Protocol (NTP).
Such time servers can be used from the context of a blockchain
using request-response oracles as shown in Fig. 2b to estimate
the transaction timestamp. To obtain the measure MRO(tx), a
smart contract would schedule a query to a time server, and
receive a callback transaction with the measure attached later.
B. Accuracy
The time measures are designed to estimate the transaction
timestamp stx, but may deviate considerably in practice. These
deviations are illustrated in Fig. 4, which displays the possible
range of outputs for each measure on a timeline.
The parameter approach MPA consistently achieves perfect
accuracy (assuming honest participants, as we will discuss in
the next section) and is the only measure with this property.
Block timestamps MBT are less accurate in that they always
deviate by the inclusion time dtx, which depends on several
factors like blockchain configuration, congestion, and how
much a sender is willing to pay in transaction fees. However,
these factors have been shown to be predictable in princi-
ple [22], meaning a high accuracy can still be achieved.
The storage oracle measure MSO depends on the frequency
the provider updates the timestamp stored in the oracle smart
contract. Since the storage oracle update needs to be performed
in the same or an earlier block as tx we can generally assert
that MSO(tx) ≤ si = stx + dtx, that is, it at most postdates
the transaction by its inclusion time. This is the only guarantee
that can be given, as otherwise the measure could be arbitrarily
outdated. The request-response oracle MRO behaves rather
obversely and at least postdates stx by dtx +mi if the oracle
provider immediately reacts upon observing the request in Bi.
Since this can not be guaranteed and the oracle provider may
only react later, the measure can be arbitrarily inaccurate.
For the block number, fluctuations in the block times
might lead to arbitrary discrepancies in both directions. As
an illustrative example, we considered the block times of the
Ethereum main chain observed within the last five years4 and
arrived at a mean b¯ of 15.19 s (min. 4.46 s, max. 30.31 s) with
a standard deviation of 2.71 s. Extrapolated linearly from the
genesis block, this would for example result in a timestamp
of 2020-03-29T06:58:49Z for block 9690267, when actually
it was mined at 2020-03-17T16:55:27Z, some 12 days earlier.
It should be noted at this point that time itself is not an
entirely static concept. Being regulated by international and
national groups, minor or major adjustments may occasionally
be prescribed which can not be accommodated for in all
systems. As a concrete example, leap seconds are irregularly
added to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), but not reflected
in Unix timestamps as used by Ethereum [20]. Thus, the block
measures can not take leap seconds into account, in contrast
to the parameter and oracle approaches.
C. Trust
Blockchains are designed to be trustless in that no partic-
ipant, be it a miner or a business partner, can deviate from
agreed-upon specifications, and the integrity of the data can
be independently verified. However, some degree of trust in
other entities is required for some time measures.
The block number approach MBN relies only on the inherent
blockchain protocol and configuration, and cannot be unilat-
erally forged since block numbers must strictly increase by
4Data from 2015-07-30–2020-03-18, https://etherscan.io/chart/blocktime
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Fig. 4. Accuracy of the measures illustrated by their possible ranges when predicting stx during the processing of transaction tx
one each block. Miners thus can not arbitrarily choose block
numbers without violating the integrity constraint, making this
the measure with the least trust assumptions.
The block timestamp measure MBT on the other hand
is set by the miner, and there is a degree of freedom in
fixing it. Ethereum, for example, demands a “reasonable” [20]
timestamp, and Tezos similarly postulates that the “protocol
design must tolerate reasonable clock drift” [21]. Bitcoin even
amended its protocol in 2016 to fix a monetary “incentive for
miners to lie about the time of their blocks”5. However, con-
sensus algorithms in practice do constraint the window allowed
by this: For one, younger blocks will usually be preferred since
they were mined first. Secondly, some implementations place
an upper limit on the deviation, e.g., 15 seconds in the future
when receiving a new block for Ethereum6.
For oracles, trust lies entirely in the third-party oracle
provider to serve correct information. Oracle providers have
acknowledged this issue and offer various mitigation options.
For example, Provable uses proof systems to certify that they
did not tamper with the data provided from external APIs7.
Other oracles rely on second-layer consensus algorithms them-
selves to decrease trust [23]. Combined with the monetary
incentives to attract and keep customers, we assess the required
trust to be on a par with the block timestamp.
Finally, the parameter approach performs worst in this
metric, since trust is placed in each collaborator in the smart
contract to attach correct timestamps MPA to the transactions.
Acknowledging that the outspoken lack of trust between
participants is one of the main reasons to use blockchain
technology in the first place [2], this severely reduces the
measure’s utility.
D. Immediacy
The time measure should be immediately available to the
smart contract code when it is executed via a transaction.
This is the case for all approaches except the request-response
oracle, which provides the measure via a delayed callback
transaction. The time measure can thus not be used in-place,
but there needs to be some kind of waiting mechanism which
increases the complexity of the smart contracts involved.
5Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) 113, https://git.io/JfYqt, 2020-04-29
6Ethereum Ethash protocol (Go version), https://git.io/JvdNc, 2020-04-02
7http://docs.provable.xyz/#security-deep-dive, 2020-04-20
E. Cost
Cost is crucial in determining the practical use of a mea-
sure. In general, blockchain transactions incur a cost, the so-
called transaction cost, which is distributed to the miners to
incentivize their operations. Transaction cost usually depends
on both the size of the transaction’s payload, as well as on
the computational effort required to execute the called smart
contract function.
We base our comparison on whether a measure incurs
any significant extra cost on top of the regular cost of the
transaction. This is not the case for the block timestamp MBT
or block number MBN, which are available “for free” in the
context of the transaction by default. The parameter measure
MPA requires adding additional payload, which will increase
the overall cost marginally. The oracle measures MSO and
MRO require an inter-contract function call, which is typically
quite expensive. Additionally, the providers of the oracles will
probably incur some kind of fee for their service. For example,
Provable prices regular API calls at USD 0.01, up to USD 0.04
if a notary proof is requested8.
F. Reliability
A measure should be reliably accessible, i.e., be resilient to
attacks and system failures. This is the case for both the block
timestamp MBT as well as the block number MBN since they
are an inherent part of the blockchain protocol, and necessarily
available whenever a transaction is executed. The parameter
measure MPA is slightly less reliable as it depends on partic-
ipants attaching a timestamp to each transaction. Mistakes in
calculating the timestamp and sending the transaction could
thus lead to deviations or errors.
For the oracle measures MSO and MRO, reliability varies
since a third-party service provider is involved [23]. This
issue is less severe in storage oracles since a dedicated smart
contract with some return value will always be available—
albeit with potentially outdated or uninitialized data—even
if the provider experiences issues. Request-response oracles
would not be able to return a value, however, if the provider
is offline. Especially long-running processes could get stuck
if the provider used when the smart contract was initially
deployed is not available anymore after some months or years.
8http://docs.provable.xyz/#pricing, 2020-04-20
TABLE III
RELATIVE COMPARISON OF TIME MEASURES WHEN IMPLEMENTING
TEMPORAL CONSTRAINTS FROM BEST (• • •) TO WORST (◦ ◦ ◦)
Temporal constraint Absolute Relative
Block timestamp MBT • • ◦ • • ◦
Block number MBN ◦ ◦ ◦ • ◦ ◦
Parameter MPA • • • • • •
Storage oracle MSO • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Request-response oracle MRO • ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
V. APPLICATION TO PROCESS EXECUTION
In this section, we will evaluate whether the time measures
are suitable for the implementation of temporal constraints
found in business processes; in particular absolute timers, rel-
ative timers, cycles, as well as deferred choice (see Sect. II-A).
A. Absolute Timers
Absolute temporal constraints model deadline scenarios, in
which certain activities have to start or finish by a specific
point in time. The start event in the running example (see
Fig. 1), for instance, governs that the process may not start
before the 1st of any specific month. In terms of blockchain-
based process execution, that means that any transaction tx
corresponding to either the timer start event itself or the “send
invoice” activity may not be accepted by the smart contract
before that. If we assume that se is the scalar timestamp
of midnight on the 1st of some month, this comes down to
determining whether se ≤ stx within the smart contract.
For any time measure M , one of two fundamental errors
may be observed: a false negative occurs if M(tx) < se ≤
stx, that is, the measure erroneously reports that se has not
happened yet although it did; and a false positive occurs if
stx < se ≤ M(tx), that is, the measure erroneously reports
that se has elapsed even when it did not.
Figure 5 shows whether the time measures exhibit those
errors. The expected result is that elapsed deadlines relative
to stx, like se1, are correctly recognized as past (dark back-
ground) and prospective ones like se2 or se3 as still open
(light background). A dotted pattern on a measure’s timeline
signifies that false positives or negatives are possible in the
interval, while a diagonal line pattern more severely signifies
that the false result will always be obtained in the interval.
For example, consider se2 which happens after the transac-
tion timestamp stx, but before it is included in a block, and
should receive a result indicating it is still open. The block
timestamp measure MBT(tx) = si will always falsely report
the deadline as past. The storage oracle measure MSO(tx)
might yield any timestamp in the time interval up to si, thus
potentially leading to a false positive. Similar errors happen
for the request-response oracle and block number measures.
Only the parameter approach MPA is consistently correct.
Table III summarizes these findings and ranks the measures
on a scale from best to worst. The parameter approach MPA
objectively performs best when absolute temporal constraints
are concerned, and always yields the right result. The block
timestamp MBT will result in a false positive if the event
trigger happens between the creation of the transaction tx and
its inclusion in a block, making it slightly worse, but still
relatively predictable [22].
The other measures, however, may perform arbitrarily bad.
The storage oracle MSO may return any timestamp before
si, and thus is only perfectly accurate for later deadlines.
The request-response oracle MRO may provide an arbitrary
timestamp after the propagation of block Bi at si + mi,
and thus the measure is only accurate for elapsed deadlines.
Consequently, the oracle measures only seem sensible when
strictly trying to avoid false positives (storage oracle) or false
negatives (request-response oracle).
On the lower end of the spectrum, the block number MBN
is only technically accurate if the deadline elapsed before the
timestamp s0 of the genesis block, i.e., before the blockchain
was even started, since that is the lower bound of timestamps
obtained per definition. Otherwise, results are arbitrary.
B. Relative Timers
Relative temporal constraints concern minimum or maxi-
mum delays between different activities. In the running ex-
ample in Fig. 1, for instance, the “7 days” until overdue
fines are added start once the invoice has been sent and the
following event-based gateway has been enabled. Supporting
relative temporal constraints thus comes down to calculating
the time difference or delta between the two corresponding
transactions. This is illustrated in Fig. 6, in which an excerpt
of a blockchain is drawn alongside the corresponding snippet
from the running example. The issue is determining in tx′
whether 7 days have passed since tx was created.
Table III summarizes the findings regarding the time mea-
sures’ suitability in resolving these kinds of relative temporal
constraints. As is the case for the absolute case, only the
parameter approach MPA consistently achieves perfect results,
that is, MPA(tx′)−MPA(tx) = stx′−stx The block timestamp
MBT performs predictably worse due to its inherent deviations
from the transaction timestamp
The block number measure MBN performs reasonably well
if we employ the alternative time interval definition given in
Sect. IV. That is, we do not calculate MBN(tx′) −MBN(tx),
but directly consider |i−j|·b¯, the total block times between Bi
and Bj . Because of the smaller multiplicator, the inaccuracy
due to fluctuations in the block time is reduced.
In general, though, the inaccuracy of a measure multiplies
when using it to calculate deltas, which becomes especially
apparent for the oracle measures. While the storage oracle
measure MSO might be adequate when trying to minimize
false positives on absolute temporal constraints, the difference
between two timestamps obtained from a storage oracle at
different times might be arbitrarily large if there are no further
requirements on the service which is queried. The same is true
for request-response oracles.
C. Cycles
Cycles are complex temporal constraints in that they can
start at an absolute or a relative point in time, and combine the
times0
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Fig. 5. Possible occurence of false negatives/positives (dotted pattern) and permanent false positives (diagonal line pattern) for absolute temporal constraints
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Fig. 6. Relative temporal constraints as deltas between transactions
difficulties discussed in both the previous sections. Thus, from
a temporal perspective, cycles are covered by our discussion
of absolute and relative temporal constraints, respectively.
The main issue is making sure that all iterations of the cycle
are hit. For example, the process in the running example (see
Fig. 1) needs to be started at the beginning of each month,
and no month may be missed. This leads to implementation
overhead in the smart contracts, which have to keep track of
some kind of counter to make sure this is not the case.
D. Deferred Choice
The deferred choice pattern introduces a major complica-
tion, which is the lack of causality between the events to
compare. Whereas for relative temporal constraints, we know
that we have to compare the delta between two transactions
which must always arrive in the same order, as governed by
the sequence flow in the model, deferred choice means that
any transaction could arrive at any time.
Consider the process snippet from the running example
in Fig. 6, for instance. The event-based gateway models a
deferred choice between “7 days”, “complaint received” and
“payment received” (clipped in the figure). Per the semantics
of BPMN, the transaction first created should be accepted.
There is no way for the smart contract to decide on this,
however: If the customer has complained already and the
transaction for “complaint received” is pending, it could be
overtaken by the “7 days” transaction even if it was actually
sent in time. Overdue fines could then be added mistakenly.
The underlying cause for this is that it is the miner’s decision
which transactions to include in a block from the pending
pool, and how to order them. Miners are not aware of domain
and application-specific constraints such as deferred choice,
and decide based on purely economical or protocol-related
reasons. As such, we can not give a clear indication as to the
performance of the different time measures.
VI. RESULTS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we summarize our results on the running
example, deriving more general application guidelines, and
evaluate the overall approach in broader terms.
A. Results and Guidelines
In Sects. IV and V, we compared the time measures
regarding their inherent properties as well as their utility in
implementing temporal constraints, respectively. A holistic
result, of course, requires more than just naively “summing
up the points”—which would yield that the block timestamp
MBT and parameter approach MPA heavily outperform all other
measures, in particular those resorting to oracles.
Instead, we propose more nuanced results. While we can
confidently attest that temporal constraints can be implemented
in blockchain-based process execution, the exact degree to
which this is the case entirely depends on the scenario and
the requirements of all involved participants. The comparisons
provided in this paper as a whole may be taken as a guideline
when evaluating measures for a concrete use case to help
arriving at a meaningful choice.
Take, for instance, the running example from Fig. 1, in
which an MNO and its customer handle an invoice. At first
glance, the parameter approach MPA seems like a good choice,
since it provides perfect accuracy, eliminating legally question-
able situations in which fines are added prematurely. However,
the customer may have doubts about the credibility of those
timestamps, as they are usually not in a perceived position of
power in face of a large corporation like an MNO. In turn, the
MNO might take care of thousands of customers, making them
relucant to place trust in customer-provided timestamps which
are hard to oversee. Thus, the block timestamp MBT seems like
the more sensible choice, since the relative deficit in accuracy
rarely comes into play when looking at durations of days or
months. In practice, deviations due to processing times—like
for bank transfers—are well-understood and should pose no
further problems when applied to blockchain technology.
B. General Evaluation
The fields of BPM and blockchain technology are highly
complex and diverse in their own rights, let alone in their
interplay. In this section, we will briefly evaluate whether this
has an impact on the results of this paper.
1) Technological Generality: The blockchain model we
introduced in Sect. III is based on common blockchains such
as Ethereum [20] and Tezos [21], but adopts a somewhat
traditional structure for the blockchain and its protocols which
initially lead to the restrictions identified in Sect. II-B. There
are blockchains which work differently, though, and may not
experience the same difficulties:
Hyperledger Fabric [24] uses sophisticated network struc-
tures and provides endorsement-based transaction timestamps.
Corda R3 [25] features a concept called “time-windows”,
in which notaries enforce certain temporal constraints. Os-
tensibly, having a participant, notary, or endorser provide
a timestamp is equivalent to the parameter approach MPA
introduced in this paper in many aspects—trust is merely
shifted. Nevertheless, novel blockchains might open up new
perspectives and issues in the future.
2) Conceptual Completeness: We did not consider some
blockchain concepts like forks. As a consequence confirmation
time, i.e., the time a participant has to wait in practice until
they can be reasonably sure a transaction was successfully
included in the blockchain, is not taken into account. This does
not majorly impact our results, though. From a smart contract’s
perspective, forks are not visible and thus do not affect any
time measure. From a participant’s perspective, personal risk
tolerance is highly individual, and confirmation times might
vary greatly [22].
3) Coverage of Temporal Constraints: While we have
largely covered inter-activity and inter-process temporal con-
straints in this paper, we did not dive deeper into intra-activity
constraints like activity durations [9]. These kinds of con-
straints are rarely found in blockchain-based business process
execution approaches since transactions usually have a very
brief time limit to avoid deadlocks and ensure throughput. This
inherently limits the time a transaction can spend processing an
activity. Nevertheless, intra-activity temporal constraints have
been shown to be in principle feasible within single blockchain
transactions [26].
Conceivably, constraints on task durations could also be
implemented using at least two transactions for each activity,
one at the start and one at the end of working on it. Addi-
tionally, task duration constraints in BPMN have been shown
to be expressible via inter-activity temporal constraints using
specific patterns of timer and signal events [27]. This would
make them susceptible to the same techniques we used in this
paper for the other temporal constraints.
VII. RELATED WORK
Temporal constraints are a well-researched area in BPM [7],
[9]. Yet, little research has been done regarding the implemen-
tation of temporal constraints in blockchain-based process ex-
ecution. Notable frameworks like Caterpillar [4], Lorikeet [3],
and others [17]–[19] do not mention them at all. Some
approaches briefly acknowledge some challenges involved and
leave them for future work [2], [5], or seem to support some
notion of temporal constraints without discussing the actual
implementation [6]. Some exceptions do exist, however.
Abid et al. extend Caterpillar to support the modeling and
execution of several intra and inter-activity temporal con-
straints like task durations and absolute start/end times [26].
Their implementation on Ethereum uses time-guards checking
block timestamps—called MBT in this paper—to evaluate
those constraints, but the authors do not provide a critical
discussion of the consequences or feasibility of that decision.
Similar restrictions apply to Mavridou and Laszka, who use
finite state machines as their source modeling language and
support timed transitions within them, again implemented
using block timestamps on Ethereum [28].
Lastly, work has been carried out regarding the simulation
and prediction of temporal aspects in blockchain-based process
execution. Yasaweerasinghelage et al. predict more technical
properties of blockchain networks like confirmation times and
how they impact business process execution [22]. Haarmann
annotates choreography models with activity-level duration in-
formation and estimates the total duration of the choreography
in face of varying inclusion times and block times through
simulation [29]. Both works abstract from the concrete source
of the timing information, i.e., they assume there is some
measure readily available.
In summary, we assert that no approach provides a system-
atic discussion and evaluation of temporal constraints and their
implementation on blockchain. Important metrics like trust or
accuracy, alternative measures like oracle-based timestamps,
or more advanced patterns of constraints like deferred choice
are not considered. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this
paper contributes the first holistic framework of its kind.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Temporal constraints are of utmost importance in business
processes. When implementing compliant blockchain-based
smart contracts for these processes, however, the blockchain
environment’s inherent restrictions pose several challenges. In
this paper, we have identified these challenges, and proposed
a number of alternative measures facilitating temporal con-
straints. We have compared these measures, and provided hints
as to their utility in process execution. In particular, the results
and their critical assessment can be used as a guideline to
choose the right measures for specific scenarios. We hope that
our contributions may help in enabling the development of
more sophisticated and complete blockchain-based business
process execution platforms.
In future work, we aim to explore further techniques not dis-
cussed in this paper. Second-layer consensus protocols could
be used to let participants in a process dispute timestamps they
suspect are invalid. Heartbeat transactions could trigger the
smart contract regularly to globally check enabled constraints,
and reduce the potential for false positives or negatives later
on. Lastly, social and organizational aspects surely warrant
a deeper look, for example regarding the actual level of
trust between collaborating enterprises and which trade-offs in
enforcing temporal constraints are acceptable in practice. This
could help to further broaden the acceptance of blockchain
technology in BPM in the near future.
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